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GAME ON: THE EPIC BATTLE BETWEEN 
THE FAA AND THE NLRA IN PROFESSIONAL 






Choices which best suit the goals and aspirations of the individual are a 
fundamental condition of freedom.1 That includes making promises or 
agreements and being bound by them. It naturally follows that parties should 
also be free to resolve their contractual disputes by a means of their choosing, 
like arbitration. In the employment sector the hurdle to “liberty to contract” 
comes from the unequal bargaining power enjoyed by employers versus the 
potential employee.  
Professional sports are particularly vulnerable to bargaining power disparity 
as there is generally one league, per sport, with a fixed number of teams.2 The 
number of players that can play in any given season is therefore finite.3 This 
supply/demand imbalance gives team owners power when dealing with athletes 
and player unions. If the oversupply of talented athletes was not enough, players 
have a limited time window in which they can perform at the highest 
competitive level. The average NFL career for example is between three to five 
 
 Kurt McWilliams is a cum laude 2020 graduate of South Texas College of Law Houston. Kurt also has 
degrees in Polymer Science from the University of Southern Mississippi (B.Sc.) and Organic Chemistry from 
Texas A&M University (Ph.D.). Kurt has enjoyed a successful career as an innovator, research scientist, R&D 
leader, and Patent Agent. Kurt has initiated and collaborated on projects around the globe including research 
programs, business management, market development, and capital expenditures. Kurt looks to 
help entrepreneurs and companies manage their technical and IP portfolios and would like to extend this to 
individual brand and performance property rights. A truism in golf and life is that "you can't hit them all bad, 
keep striving for victory" unless someone invents a golf ball that lowers your handicap by seven shots. 
     1. CLAUDE D. ROHWER & ANTHONY M. SKROCKI, CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 2 (7th ed. 2010). 
     2. NBA – 30 teams, NFL – 32 teams, MLB – 30 teams, NHL – 31 teams, WNBA – 12 teams, NWSL – 10 
teams. 
     3. Maximum number of players allowed per league including supplemental or practice squads, NBA – 480 
players, NFL – 1,760 players, MLB – 1,200 players, NHL – 731 players, WNBA – 144 players, NWSL – 234 
players. 
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years.4 Sitting out a single season can reduce the earning potential of an NFL 
player by twenty to thirty-three percent. This ticking clock puts the athlete at a 
further disadvantage with respect to employment bargaining power. 
To restore the balance, employees can band together and collectively 
bargain for better wages, benefits, working conditions, etc. Collective 
bargaining agreements between player associations and leagues are present in 
most professional sports.5 These agreements rely heavily on arbitration6 to 
resolve disputes. Collective bargaining7 and arbitration8 are enshrined in law to 
encourage parties to aspire to their “better natures” and provide a recourse when 
they do not.9 It is the collaboration of these two statutes that has driven labor 
law since the 1930’s. The Supreme Court in 1964 stated in Carey that “the 
underlying objective of the National Labor Relations [Laws] is to promote 
collective bargaining agreements and to help give substance to such agreements 
through the arbitration process.” 10  
Carey might have signaled the golden age of harmony between the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA)11 and National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).12 The 
Supreme Court itself proclaims a duty to “interpret Congress’s statutes as a 
harmonious whole rather than at war with one another.”13 Expansion of territory 
by the judiciary and administrative agencies made it inevitable that conflict 
would arise. This paper will explore the evolution of the FAA and NLRA from 
bosom buddies to perpetual combatants and its potential impact on professional 
sports. Much like the demise of the Mega-Powers14 in 1989 perhaps the FAA, 
a.k.a. Hulk Hogan, and NLRA, a.k.a. Randy “The Macho Man” Savage, were 
never meant to be friends. 
 




     5. Professional Golfers of America Tour, Ladies Professional Golf Association, National Women’s Soccer 
League, MMA, Boxing, Professional Wrestling do not operate under collective bargaining agreements.  
     6. Michael Hayes, 'Hey, We Were Here First!': Union Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act, 70 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 991 (2020) (citing statistics estimating ninety-nine percent of all major union-employer 
collective bargaining agreements resolve disputes with binding arbitration).  
     7. See Federal Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S § 157 (2021). 
     8. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2021). 
     9. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE NOTEBOOKS OF LAZARUS LONG 64 (1978) (“Never make your appeal to a 
man’s better nature; he may not have one”) (ebook). 
     10. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 265, 274 (1964) (Both the majority and dissent 
agreed to this sentiment). 
     11. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2021). 
     12. See Federal Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 151 (2021). 
     13. EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). 
     14. The Mega-Powers was a World Wrestling Federation team duo composed of Hulk Hogan and Randy 
“Macho Man” Savage. The duo was formed in 1987 and participated in tag team and individual events. As 
part of the ongoing performance scripts the partners provided mutual aid and assistance, until ultimately 
disbanding in 1989 due to internal jealousy and distrust. See The Mega Powers, Fandom, 
https://prowrestling.fandom.com/wiki/The_Mega_Powers (last visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
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I. EXPANSION OF FAA TO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 
 
     The FAA15 was born in 1925 when Congress codified their wish for parties 
to resolve commercial differences via arbitration. Congress instructed federal 
courts to uphold arbitration clauses as written by the parties, and the decisions 
resulting from them.16 The FAA included two key prongs, the first that 
arbitration was applicable to commercial transactions defined as interstate 
commerce17 and the second that enforcement of arbitration could be voided if 
the contract itself was revocable, a “saving clause.”18 The FAA does not cover 
“employment contracts”19 for seamen, railroad, or any other class of workers 
engaged in interstate commerce.20 However, the application of the FAA to 
employment contracts has been with us since 1957 in Lincoln Mills21 and most 
recently confirmed in 2018 with EPIC Systems Corporation.22 Over time the 
resistance to excluding arbitration from employment contracts has eroded.23 A 




The Gilmer Court concluded that the requirement of arbitration imposed by 
a third party was not in violation of the FAA employment agreement 
exclusion.25 Arbitration was not part of the employment agreement between the 
employee and employer but rather a condition of professional registration with 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The NYSE bound both parties to 
resolve any “dispute, claim or controversy” between them via arbitration.26 The 
Court determined that this includes contractual and statutory issues.27 The 
 
     15. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2021). 
     16. See generally id. 
     17. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2021). 
     18. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2021). 
     19. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 541 (2019) (defining employment contracts as “Congress 
used the term ‘contracts of employment’ in a broad sense to capture any contract for the performance 
of work by workers”). 
     20. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 (2021) (stating it was due to pressure from labor unions that the 
employment contract exception was included. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 
353 U.S. 448, 467-468 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
     21. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 449 (1957). 
     22. EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1616 (2018). 
     23.  See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 467-68 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Examples include: the exception applied only to transportation workers; the 
absence of congressional action to reverse extension of FAA to employment contracts; Congress did 
specifically modify EEOC to add arbitration.  
     24. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
     25. See id. 
     26. Id. at 23 (stating the parties never raised the FAA employment contract exception during litigation, so 
the court was not compelled to rule on it).   
     27. Id. at 24 (stating the Court established that arbitration was suitable for resolution of substantive issues 
unless Congress expressly precluded the enforcement via the text, legislative history, or underlying purpose). 
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attenuation of the arbitration requirement from the employment relationship was 
determined to be enough to avoid the FAA exemption. 
The dissent was unmoved by the distinction of third-party action compelling 
arbitration. An employment agreement is an employment agreement, and as 
such, is exempt from FAA coverage.28 The dissent would prefer to exempt from 
FAA protection employment agreements that are conditioned upon acceptance 
of arbitration as the means to settle employment disputes.  The dissent felt that 
an employee in those cases should be allowed to pursue grievances, contractual 
or statutory, in a judicial forum.29 The dissent further reminded us that earlier 
courts had found no difference between collectively or individually bargained 
employment contracts with respect to FAA exemption.30 At this moment in 
time, represented and non-represented worker employment contracts were 
considered the same in effect. 
Throughout the history of the case, the animus toward arbitration was on 
full display. The Court devoted two and a half pages31 rebutting the perceived 
limitations of arbitration as a process and the competency of arbitrators. The 
Court corrected its prior decision in Gardner-Denver Co. in which the Court 
had expressed that arbitration of statutory claims was inferior to judicial 
resolution.32  The decision in Gilmer reinforces the premise that arbitration is an 
equivalent forum for resolution of both contractual and statutory claims.33   
That is not to say that arbitration is a replacement for judicial processes. 
Arbitration can only handle controversies arising out of the contract, like a 
refusal to perform in whole or part, or a written agreement to submit to 
arbitration related to an ongoing controversy.34 The arbiter’s power is 
exclusively granted and limited by the agreement entered into by the parties.35 
Arbitration can handle complex issues and larger classes of parties,36 but that 
does not mean that arbiters are able to entertain legal theories outside of the 
scope of authority. The important aspect of Gilmer was that arbitration clauses 
in employment contracts would be held enforceable under the FAA. At the time 
 
     28. Id. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
     29. See Id. at 41-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
     30. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court in Lincoln Mills had never explicitly ruled that 
the FAA exemption for employment contracts was binding on individual or collectively bargained 
employment contracts. But it also did not overrule the 5th Cir. which had determined that the exemption 
precluded employment agreements from FAA coverage).  
     31. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30–32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
     32. Id. at 34, n. 5 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 (1974)). 
     33. Id. at 30 (going further the Court said that a party does not lose the substantive rights afforded by a 
statute if it resolves the conflict via arbitration (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634, (1985))). 
     34. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 262 (2009). 
     35. Id. at 263 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981)).  
     36. Brief for National Academy of Arbitrators as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, EPIC Sys. Corp. 
v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2838) (describing the ability of arbitration 
to handle class or collective arbitrations dealing with substantive law and contractual issues). 
MCWILLIAMS– ARTICLE 31.2 5/18/2021  10:39 PM 
2021]   BATTLE BETWEEN THE FAA & NLRA  271 
 
 
of Gilmer in 1991, most employment contracts that contained arbitration clauses 
were collective bargaining agreements. These were made possible by the 
passage of two key statutes, the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA) 37 and the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).38 
  
III. ENTER THE NLRA 
 
At the time of FAA passage there was no federal protection for the 
formation of unions or collective bargaining. This changed with the passage of 
the NLGA39 in 1932 and completed with the NLRA40 in 1935. These statutes 
opened the door for employees to form labor organizations and collectively 
bargain for better wages, benefits, and working conditions. The NLRA policy 
rationales included reducing the number of strikes and work stoppages, which 
directly impacted the flow of commerce within the United States.41 Low worker 
productivity had the effect of raising consumer prices and curtailing supply 
which was especially crippling to New Deal42 attempts to offset the great 
depression.  
Once collective bargaining began to take hold, it was inevitable that the 
resolution of employment contract issues would be settled by non-judicial 
means. While there was no express condition for arbitration mentioned in the 
1935 Act, the Act did encourage “practices fundamental to the friendly 
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, 
or other working conditions . . . .”43 The evolution in labor law was leading 
collective bargaining agreements to allocate more and more of the potential 
disputes to alternative resolution procedures, like arbitration. 
Collective bargaining agreements usually require individual employees to 
submit issues and grievances to the union. The union collates and decides which 
issues have merit and presents them individually or collectively to the employer 
for resolution. Many contracts require mediation as a first step, followed by 
arbitration, and then filing a complaint with an appropriate regulatory agency. 
 
     37. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §101 (2021). 
     38. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 (2021). 
     39. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §101 (2021). 
     40. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 (2021). 
     41. Id.  
     42. See generally Emergency Banking Act, Pub. L. 73-1, 48 Stat. 1 (1933); Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. 
73-66, 48 Stat. 162; Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA), Pub. L. 72-302, 47 Stat. 709 (1932); National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), Pub. L. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933); Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-
271, 49 Stat. 620; Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. 75-718, 53 Stat. 1060 (1938); Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, HISTORY.COM (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/great-depression/history-of-
the-fdic; Works Progress Administration (WPA), HISTORY.COM (Jun. 10, 2019), https://www.hi 
story.com/topic s/great-depre ssion/works-progress-administration. 
     43. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 (2021). 
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In shop environments, grievances could also be addressed real time with the 
employer through an appointed shop steward. 
In the professional sports arena, the NLRA changed the relationship 
dynamic between athletes and team owners. Prior to collective action, team 
owners as employers were under no pressure to deal with players consistently 
or fairly.44 For instance, owners could contract two players of similar 
performance levels with entirely different compensation schemes. Major stars 
of the game received slightly better treatment, but the journeyman player 
worked without contract minimums, or guarantees.45 Like many employers of 
their day, the owners were reluctant to provide fundamental benefits like proper 
safety equipment, medical insurance, and pensions unless forced to do so.46 The 
NLRA changed that by expressly defining “unfair labor practices” exposing 
owners and leagues to fines and sanctions.47 
Players unions and associations began to utilize arbitration to resolve 
contractual issues and grievances arising under the collectively bargained 
agreements. Many of these agreements contain alternate arbitration pathways 
depending on the type of dispute.48 In the NBA collective bargaining agreement 
there is an express arbitration procedure by which an issue can be heard within 
 
     44. See Cym H. Lowell, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Team Sport Industry, 38 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1973) (commenting on the improvement that collective bargaining brought to 
professional sports. The bare-bones benefits received was compounded by owners viewing players as property 
for use as they saw fit. The dreaded “reserve clause” under which the careers of players could be at the mercy 
of capricious owners who would routinely blacklist or freeze out players. Okay that behavior still exists. The 
idea that players could oppose owner actions or force them to act reasonably was hard to conceive prior to the 
NLRA). 
     45. See generally Ryan T. Dryer, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective Bargaining Agreements in 
Professional Sports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 267 (2008). 
     46. See generally OSHA Celebrates 40 Years of Accomplishments in the Workplace, U.S. DEPT’T OF LAB., 
https://www.osha.gov/osha40/OSHATimeline.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2021) (Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) established safety standards – 1971); Aaron E. Carroll, The Real Reason the 
U.S. Has Employee-Sponsored Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.co 
m/2017/09/05/upshot/the-real-reason-the-us-has-employer-sponsored-health-insurance.html (National War 
Labor Board provides a tax exemption for employee provided health insurance – 1942); Internal Steven A. 
Bank, Revenue Act of 1954, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclop edias-
almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/internal-revenue-a ct-1954 (last visited Mar. 27, 2021) (Revenue Act 
established tax exemptions for employer provided pensions – 1954). 
     47. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 (2021). 
     48. See e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement between National Hockey League and National Hockey 
League Players’ Association, NHLPA (Set. 16, 2012), https://www.nhlpa.com/the-pa/cba [hereinafter NHL 
CBA] (describing the NHL CBA’s salary, impartial and system arbitration procedures); Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, NBPA (Jan. 19, 2017), https://cosmic-s3.imgix.net/3c7a0a50-8e11-11e9-875d-3d44e94ae33f-
2017-NBA-NBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf [hereinafter NBA CBA] (stating the NBA utilizes 
impartial, system and an expedited arbitration procedure); Collective Bargaining Agreement, NFLPA (Aug. 
4, 2011), https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows. net/media/Default/PDFs/2011%20CBA%20Updated%20w 
ith%20Side%20Letters%20thru%201-5-15.pdf [hereinafter NFL CBA] (stating the NFL uses a benefits, 
impartial and system arbitration path); Collective Bargaining Agreement between Major League Soccer and 
Major League Soccer Players Union, MLSPA, https://s3.amazonaws.com/mlspa/Collective-Bargaining-
Agreement-February-1-2015.pdf?mtime=20180213190926 [hereinafter MLS CBA] (stating the MLS uses a 
single arbitration procedure for all disputes); 2017-2021 Basic Agreement, MLBPA, https://www.mlbplayers. 
com/cba [hereinafter MLB CBA] (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
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24 hours of a grievance being filed.49 The requirement for employees to use 
contractually mandated dispute resolution in collective bargaining agreements 
has not been without challenge.  
 
IV. PYETT (STATUTORY CLAIMS) 
 
The court in Pyett50 faced a situation like Gilmer51 in which a worker 
challenged the arbitration requirement of an employment contract. In this case 
the employee was covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The lower 
courts held that a collective bargaining agreement could not waive an 
individual’s rights to seek a judicial forum for statutory claims.52  The lower 
courts were not sure if Gilmer had superseded a prior holding in Gardner-
Denver with respect to collective bargaining agreements.53  
The NLRA54 provides that an individual can be represented in all matters55 
by the “labor organization.”56 In Pyett, the court determined that the use of 
arbitration was “part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself”57 and 
that a statutory grievance58 was no different than any other grievance to be 
addressed. The court could find nothing in the law that suggested a distinction 
between individually or collectively bargained agreements on the permissibility 
of arbitration clauses.59 The court did suggest that if the parties wished to 
arbitrate statutory claims it should be “explicitly stated”60 in the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
 
     49. NBA CBA, supra note 48. 
     50. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). 
     51. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
     52. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35952 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2006); Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 
498 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007). 
     53. See Pyett, 498 F.3d at 92. 
     54. National Labor Relation Act 29 U.S.C §152(5), §2(5) (2021) (stating the freedom to contract is one of 
the fundamental policies of the NLRA). 
     55. 14 Penn Plaza LLC., 556 U.S. at 274–75, 279 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (voicing concerns that the 
reversal of Gardner-Denver would negatively impact individual employees’ rights to bring statutory claims 
against employers. The central thrust is a discomfort with collective bargaining as it subordinates the rights 
of the individual with respect to the best interests of the collective. The dissent further suggested that stare 
decisis provides that an individual may waive their rights in an employment contract, but not in a collectively 
bargained agreement (Souter, J. citing Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998))). 
     56. National Labor Relation Act 29 U.S.C §152(5), §2(5) (2021) (defining the NLRA as “any organization 
of any kind, or an agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and 
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor 
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions or work”). For professional athletes, the 
collective bargaining is done by player associations and not traditional unions. Even though the associations 
are recognized by traditional unions like the AFL-CIO or Teamsters.  
     57. 14 Penn Plaza LLC., 556 U.S. at 256 (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 
(1957)). 
     58. Id. at 251 (stating Pyett was an age discrimination case under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000)). 
     59. Id. at 258. 
     60. Id. at 258.  
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V. TAG IN ANOTHER COMBATANT – NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
 
Pyett seemed to close the door on challenges to FAA enforcement of 
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Not so fast, in 2012 the NLRB 
began invalidating individualized arbitration clauses per Section 7 of the 
NLRA.61  Two rationales were offered, the first was a right of employees “to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection . . . .”62 The NLRB reasoned that “mutual aid or 
protection” included the efforts of an employee to pursue63 class action suits for 
similarly situated employees.64 The second was that an arbitration clause that 
“explicitly prohibits the filing of claims with the Board or, more generally, with 
administrative agencies must be found unlawful.”65 The Board has applied this 
to arbitration clauses which “when reasonably interpreted”66 would lead an 
employee to believe that only arbitration can be used to pursue disputes against 
the employer.  
 
VI. IS CLASS ACTION AN NLRA RIGHT? 
 
The pivotal case involved an employee working as a construction 
superintendent for D.R. Horton who, as a condition of employment, signed a 
Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA). The MAA contained two passages that 
were particularly troubling to the NLRB. The first was for employees “to submit 
all employment related disputes and claims to arbitration”67 and the second that 
the arbitrator “may hear only Employee’s individual claims and does not have 
the authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action . . . .”68 The 
NLRB determined that the limitation of arbitration to individual claims would 
foreclose an employee’s right to provide “mutual aid or protection” as preserved 
in Section 7.69 Furthermore, any employment contract that violated Section 7 
would be illegal and unenforceable.70 An illegal contract is not eligible for FAA 
protection due to the “saving clause” of the FAA.71  
 
     61. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3, 2012). 
     62. Federal Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S § 157 (2021). 
     63. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 2015 NLRB 774 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 26, 2015). 
     64. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB at 2286. 
     65. E. A. Renfroe & Co., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 710 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 16, 2019).  
     66. Boeing Co., 2017 NLRB LEXIS 634 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 14, 2017). 
     67. In Re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB at 2278. 
     68. Id. at 2291. 
     69. Id. at 2283.  
     70. Id. at 2286. 
     71. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 348, 358 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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The Fifth Circuit ultimately refused to affirm the Board’s decision and ruled 
that access to class action suits are not substantive rights but procedural ones.72 
The court referenced numerous rulings73 that provided no substantive right to 
proceed collectively. Class action attorneys may wish for a substantive right of 
clients to file a class action, but the Fifth Circuit could not find one. The NLRB 
continued this reasoning in similar cases, some of which were affirmed by other 
circuits74 setting the stage for the battle royal, EPIC Systems Corporation.  
 
VII. THE SHOWDOWN, EPIC SYSTEMS CORP. 
 
EPIC Systems Corporation75 encompassed three cases, Ernst & Young, LLP 
v. Morris,76 Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB77 and Lewis v. EPIC Systems, Corp.78 
The question was if an employee has a right to class or collective action if they 
agreed to be bound by individual arbitration?79 The employees alleged job 
misclassification80 and wished to recover lost overtime payments via class 
action.81 When large employers are involved, class action suits can result in big 
settlements and fees for attorneys. In contrast, individualized arbitration 
disputes are smaller and less attractive as fee generators.82  
 
     72. Id. at 359. 
     73. Id. at 357–58 (citing AmChem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-613 (1997); Deposit Guar. 
Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980); Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ. Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 643 (5th Cir. 
2012); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus. Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004); Adkins 
v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 506 (4th Cir. 2002); Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 319-320 
(9th Cir. 1996)). 
     74. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits endorsed and affirmed the actions of the NLRB in granting class action 
as a statutory right. See Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, EPIC Backslide: The Supreme Court 
Endorses Mandatory Individual Arbitration Agreement--#TimesUp on Workers’ Rights, 15 STAN. J. C.R. & 
C.L. 43 (2019). 
     75. EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
     76. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016).   
     77. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015). Interestingly, the procedural history 
of Murphy Oil USA, Inc. is a doppelganger of D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2013). The 
NLRB repeated its ruling that the agreement to individualized arbitration foreclosed collective action in 
violation of Section 7 of the NLRA. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 808 F.3d 1013. The NLRB then petitioned the 
Fifth Circuit of Appeals to review the petition en banc to overrule its decision in D.R. Horton. Id. The Fifth 
Circuit of Appeals was “disinclined to acquiesce to their request.” Id.; PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE 
CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney Pictures 2003). 
     78. Lewis v. EPIC Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016). 
     79. Numerous circuits followed the Fifth Circuit’s lead in D.R.Horton: see Walthour v. Chipio Windshield 
Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 948 (2014); Richards v. Ernst & 
Young, LLP, 744 F.3d 1072, 1075 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 932 (2014); Owen v. Bristol 
Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053–55 (8th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
     80. See Blake R. Bertanga, The “Miscellaneous Employee”: Exploring the Boundaries of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act’s Administrative Exemption, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 485 (2012). 
     81. Id. at 497. 
     82. EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1647 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Class actions of this type are not new. It was estimated that in the early 
2000’s employers were spending nearly $2 billion a year in job classification 
class-action settlements.83 This might lead one to believe that employers are 
villains,84 but the classification of jobs exempt from wage and overtime 
regulations is statutory.85 The exempt classifications are fixed while the wage 
basis of employees is continually changing. Almost 11 million service sector 
jobs were added prior to the 2004 revamp that met the antiquated exempt 
categories. These employees would have traditionally been subject to wage and 
overtime regulations.  
Newton’s third law of motion defines that “for every action . . . there is an 
equal [but] opposite reaction.”86 In response to the onslaught of class action 
suits, employer’s began requiring employees to agree to individualized 
arbitration as a condition of employment.  Represented workers have long used 
arbitration to settle grievances and contractual disputes. For non-represented 
workers, especially lower-level executive, administrative and professional 
workers this was a new development.  
To offset the use of individualized arbitration the NLRB and the dissent in 
EPIC Systems Corporation wished to expand the NLRA to include class action 
under the “mutual aid or protection” umbrella. Invalidating87 individualized 
arbitration in favor of class action could overcome the perceived reluctance of 
lawyers88 to take low fee cases.89 A right to class action was already in the 
Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA)90 permitting employees to collectively 
 
     83.  Bertanga, supra note 81, at 498 (citing Mark Wilson, Omnibus Spending Bill Provisions Pt. I: New 
Overtime Law to End Pay for Up to 8 Million Workers, DEMOCRACY NOW (Jan. 22, 2004), 
https://www.democracynow.org/2004/1/2 2/omnibus_spending_bill_provisions_pt_i). 
     84. See EPIC Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1633. It is true that in some cases an employer will classify 
employees incorrectly to avoid labor costs, but that it is partly due to the legislative branch not updating the 
categories on regular basis. 
     85. 29 U.S.C.A. § 213 (2021). 
     86. NASA, Newton’s Third Law: Applied to Aerodynamics, GLENN RSCH. CTR., 
https://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/K12/airplane/newton3.html#:~:text=His%20third%20law%20states%20th
at,opposite%20force%20on%20object%20A (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (citing Issac Newton, Principia 
Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis (1686)).  
     87.  EPIC Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1646. The dissent sees the NLRA as “an implied repeal” of the FAA in 
the event of conflict between the two statutes. Id. 
     88. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Caban v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase & Co., 606 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2009)) (“Sutherland's only option in pursuing 
her individual claim is thus to retain an attorney on a contingent fee basis. But just as no rational person would 
expend hundreds of thousands of dollars to recover a few thousand dollars in damages, ‘no attorney (regardless 
of competence) would ever take such a case on a contingent fee basis’"). 
     89. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOY RADICE, BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 
Preface (2016) (ebook) (postulating that persons making less than $50,000 USD per year would not be able 
to afford legal representation for claims such as: nonfatal medical malpractice, non-class action employment 
disputes, minor housing disputes, wills and guardianships, divorces, child custody, warranty consumer claims, 
bankruptcy, denied governmental claims, veterans seeking mental health or medical assistance from the VA, 
immigrants seeking asylum) (emphasis added).  
     90. Federal Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C.S §§ 201-19 (2021). 
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recover lost wages. It seems a drastic action to create an additional NLRA right 
just to allow attorneys to recover higher fees.  
The dissent made a curious comment that the opportunity cost for selecting 
arbitration is unfavorable when compared to judicial remedies.91 This was based 
on figures provided in a parallel case involving Ernst & Young.92 The plaintiff 
entered into the record, uncontested by the defendant, an arbitration cost 
estimate of $160,000 for attorney’s fees, costs of $6,000, and an expert in 
accountancy which may exceed $33,500.93 What? The plaintiff’s case was for 
an overtime loss of roughly $1,867.02.94 The Plaintiff went further to complain 
that an award of fees was at the discretion of the arbitrator and therefore 
unreasonable. Discretion of a judge seems to be preferred to that of an arbitrator. 
A typical arbitration costs95 between $1,000 to $3,000 dollars for costs and 
share of arbitrator’s fees.96 One would hope that attorney’s fees for a single 
arbitration are no more than the arbiter’s fees, but that still places the breakeven 
cost of arbitration at around $6,000. This scenario favors the employer until the 
value of the worker’s individual claim exceeds the breakeven point. This is true 
of both arbitration and judicial action. Collective action spreads the costs over 
more contributors reducing the energy barrier to initiate dispute resolution. Once 
a   critical mass of workers claims is reached, the balance shifts in the workers’ 
favor to obtain fair settlement. 
It is safe to pose that arbitration is more economical than judicial relief, and 
collective action has a higher return on investment than individual suit.97 The 
best possible outcome for workers would be collective arbitration. This is the 
model unions have been using for decades to resolve workplace disputes. The 
dissent in EPIC Systems Corporation parroting the NLRB advocated instead for 
contingent representation of a class action and a judicial forum where fee 
shifting provisions were in place.  
Judicial class action would seem to be a panacea for employees to obtain 
justice. A better description would be that it deters employers from engaging in 
or repeating the practice in the future. Judicial class action doesn’t always 
provide relief for affected employees. In Hobon,98 delivery drivers for Pizza Hut 
filed a class action under the FLSA to recover unpaid delivery expenses. The 
 
     91. EPIC Sys. Corp., 138 U.S. at 1636, 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
     92. Sutherland, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 547.  
     93. Id. at 551–52. 
     94. Id. 
     95. See generally Paul Stephan, Nothing to Say for the FAA: Why Arbitration Does Not Offer Unparalleled 
and Mutual Benefits, UNIV. OF MEM. L. REV., Forthcoming, 42-43 (Feb. 1, 2020). 
     96. See A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy’—Causes and (Partial) Cures, 
67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 676 (2002). 
     97. Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Class Actions and Class Action Waivers, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 305, 308 (2015).   
     98. Hobon v. Pizza Hut of Southern WI, Inc., No. 17-cv-947-slc, 2019 WL 3765832, at *1 (W.D. Wis. 
Aug. 9, 2019). 
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class action was handled by a single law firm that ultimately negotiated a 
settlement of $500,000, to which $195,613 was paid in attorney’s fees and 
costs.99 The individual drivers received $144.03 as compensation, is that justice? 
Who really benefitted from the action?  
In the EPIC Systems Corporation majority opinion, the Court reiterated that 
the purpose of the FAA was to provide parties with a method to resolve 
contractual disputes without resorting to judicial action.100 At the heart of the 
disagreement is whether the NLRA can be used to deem an employment 
contract unconscionable,101 or revocable102 and subject to the saving clause of 
the FAA. The Court suggested that the conditions for revocation or illegality of 
a contract were limited to generally applicable defenses of fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability.103 The Court settled on what is not included are “defenses 
that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an 
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”104 It would be odd to say that an arbitration 
clause renders the contract illegal, thus exempting it from the Act that says the 
arbitration clauses are legal. Nice try. 
 
VIII. EPIC SYSTEMS CORP. AND UNCONSCIONABILITY 
 
Justice Thomas in concurrence105 thought that unconscionability was 
resolved in earlier cases like American Express106 and Concepcion107. The 
saving clause is limited to defenses that may be invoked related to contract 
formation, not public policy issues that render a contract illegal. This public 
policy argument is still being used to invalidate arbitration provisions in 
employment contracts. In a state law case, Ramos, a California Appeals Court 
ruled that in California, class action waivers can be unconscionable in 
employment contracts. 108 It was acknowledged that Concepcion established the 
preemption of the FAA and overruled a California law banning class action 
waivers in consumer contracts. What was distinguished was that Concepcion 
never referenced employment contracts or overruled the leading case in 
California, Armendariz.109 As such the California court viewed mandatory 
 
      99. Id. 
     100. See EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018). 
     101. Id. at 1622 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)). 
     102. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015). 
     103. EPIC Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1616 (2018) (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333, 339 (2011)).  
     104. Id. at 1622. 
     105. Id. at 1632–33. 
     106. Id. at 1632 (citing Am. Express Co., v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 239 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
     107. Id. at 1633 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 353 (2011) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
     108. Ramos v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 691-95 (Cal. App. 5th 2018). 
     109. See generally Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). 
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arbitration clauses covering statutory claims in employment contracts 
unconscionable. Wait, wasn’t this covered in Pyett?  
The California courts view employment contracts as contracts of adhesion 
unless the potential employee can negotiate the terms.110 Gilmer established that 
unequal bargaining power is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration 
clauses in employment contracts are never enforceable.111 Collective bargaining 
agreements can be viewed as contracts of adhesion like any other employment 
contract.112 To be fair, there is value in having collective negotiating power and 
comfort in “better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.”113 But for the 
employee to earn a paycheck they must accept the terms of the agreement 
whether collectively bargained for or not.114 This is especially true of workers 
who are hired during the term of the collective agreement as they neither 
participated in its creation or ratification.  
A similar approach succeeded in Ziglar in which a clause to arbitrate was 
invalidated under Arizona employment laws.115 The clause was deemed 
unconscionable because it did not specifically allow for treble damages, 
attorney’s fees, costs, or hardship cost reduction as permitted under Arizona 
wage statutes and judicial procedures.116 Once more it was posited that the 
attorney’s fees for arbitration would be insurmountable for an individual 
employee to bear without fee shifting. In Arizona, the arbitration clause must 
incorporate every aspect of state employment law and judicial procedure. Is this 
really going to make arbitration more effective? This is a “ticky tack” 117 whistle 
on an NBA player for hand checking, it may be true but was the foul necessary? 
Overall, EPIC Systems Corporation did not have a profound effect on 
professional sports. Team sports are predominantly covered by collective 
bargaining agreements or athletes are represented by players associations. 
 
     110. Ramos, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 691 (describing how collectively bargained agreements are exempted, 
they are perceived to be negotiated on equal terms). 
     111. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). 
     112. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S.4214, Subcommittee on the 
Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9 (1923). The dissent in Gilmer quoted Senator Walsh who stated that “It is 
the same with a good many contracts of employment. A man says ‘These are our terms. All right, take it or 
leave it.’ Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it”). 
     113. The Phrase Finder, PHRASES.ORG, https://www.phrases.org.uk/bulletin_b oard/5/messages/791.html 
(Last visited Mar. 5th, 2021) (stating that the phrase has been attributed to R. Taverner, Collection of Irish 
Proverbs, 1539). 
     114. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 275 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 
Inc., 450 U.S. 744, (1981) The dissent reiterated the concern that collectively bargained terms benefit the 
majority and may not serve the interests of an individual employee. In that scenario it doesn’t matter to that 
employee how the bargain was struck; the result is the same “take it or leave it.” Id.  
     115. Ziglar v. Express Messenger Sys. Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34951. 
     116. Id.  
     117. A ticky tack foul is a basketball term to describe an unnecessary foul called by the referee. The 
purported foul did not disrupt game play or involve significant contact between players.  
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Individual sport athletes are considered independent contractors118 and outside 
the scope of the NLRA. The independent contractor designation also applies to 
many of the support staff and vendors used to stage athletic events. Professional 
sport operates with a significant portion of the labor pool outside the scope of 
the battle between the FAA and NLRA. What EPIC Systems Corporation did 
was challenge the NLRB to find alternative rationales to invalidate employment 
contracts.  
 
IX. DO ARBITRATION CLAUSES NEED DISCLAIMERS? 
 
Apparently so. Since the demise of the Section 7 class action right in EPIC 
Systems Corporation the NLRB has emphasized the importance of the second 
D.R. Horton invalidation theory. An arbitration clause can be invalidated for not 
informing the employee of administrative law options available to them. If the 
Board feels that the language misleads employees into thinking that arbitration 
“restricts employee access to the Board and its processes,”119 then it violates 
Section 7 of the NLRA. The arbitration clause is deemed invalid and 
unenforceable. Since EPIC Systems Corporation NLRB judges have issued 
more than 20 opinions120 invalidating arbitration clauses using this approach.121  
Gilmer established that a clause that forbids filing an administrative agency 
action is invalid.122 The murky view is when arbitration clauses are facially 
 
     118. See Vincent Salminen, UFC Fighters Are Taking a Beating Because They Are Misclassified as 
Independent Contractors. An Employee Classification Would Change the Fight Game for the UFC, Its 
Fighters, and MMA, 7 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L. F. 193 (2017). 
     119. Hooters Ontario Mills, 2020 NLRB LEXIS 151, at *1 (N.L.R.B. May 6, 2020). 
     120. See, e.g., id.; see, e.g., IIG Wireless, Inc., 2020 NLRB LEXIS 223 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 30, 2020); Aryzta, 
LLC, 2020 NLRB LEXIS 256 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 13, 2020); Dynamic Nursing Servs., Inc., 2020 NLRB LEXIS 
136 (N.L.R.B.  Mar. 27, 2020); Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2020 NLRB LEXIS 27 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 24, 2020); 
Bloomingdale’s Inc., 2020 NLRB LEXIS 19 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 21, 2020); Haynes Bldg. Servs., LLC, 2019 
NLRB LEXIS 737 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 23, 2019); CBRE, Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 735 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 16, 2019); 
E.A. Renfroe & Co., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 710 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 16, 2019); Uber Techs. Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 
716 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 12, 2019); Kelly Servs. Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 705 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 12, 2019); Private 
Nat’l Mortg. Acceptance Co. LLC, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 684 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 9, 2019); Keiser Univ., 2019 
NLRB LEXIS 669 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 27, 2019); Four Seasons Healthcare & Wellness Ctr., LP, 2019 NLRB 
LEXIS 654 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 21, 2019); Planet Beauty, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 551 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 8, 2019); 
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 542 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 30, 2019); Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley, 
LLC, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 351 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 18, 2019); GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 187 
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 19, 2019); Concord Honda, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 166 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 7, 2019); We Work Cos. 
Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 155 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 1, 2019); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 17 
(N.L.R.B. Jan. 2, 2019); Applebee’s, 2018 NLRB LEXIS 611 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 4, 2018). 
     121. Ironically, the Board waits for an aggrieved employee to file an NLRA or FLSA action so it can 
invalidate the arbitration clause on the basis that the language of the clause leads the employee to believe they 
cannot file an NLRA or FLSA action.  
     122. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (resolving this issue in Gilmer when 
the Court pushed back on the idea that arbitration would undermine agency enforcement of statutory rights. 
“An individual ADEA claimant subject to an arbitration agreement will still be free to file a charge with the 
EEOC, even though the claimant is not able to institute a private judicial action”). 
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neutral123 and do not address issues beyond the clause itself.124 The Board 
focuses on determiners like “any” 125 and “all” to extrapolate that the “reasonable 
interpretation”126 of the clause by employees would be to prohibit access to the 
Board and its processes. The arbitration clauses that are found lawful have 
conspicuously displayed verbiage excepting agency action from arbitration.127 
This is a collateral strike on arbitration which skirts the direct assault prohibition 
penned in EPIC Systems Corporation.128  
A quirky outcome of this approach is the possible effect on employment 
contracts including collective bargaining agreements. A survey of various 
professional sports collective bargaining agreements129 reveals that arbitration 
clauses do not mention the NLRA or any administrative agency. There is no 
disclaimer language and “any” and “all” are used to describe the breadth of 
arbitration coverage. Are we to believe that represented workers are necessarily 
foreclosed from filing unfair labor practice actions? Of course not. Are these 
clauses going to be determined to be invalid, rendering arbitration unusable? 
No, because the NLRB views collective bargaining agreements as being valid 
and enforceable merely because they were collectively bargained. 
This seems to create a diverging set of rights for represented and non-
represented workers. It was established in Pyett130 that an employee subject to 
 
     123. Boeing, 2017 NLRB LEXIS 634, 2 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 14, 2017) (stating if a work rule or employment 
contract clause does not “explicitly restrict” Section 7 rights, then it is considered facially neutral). 
     124. See generally WARREN’S FORMS OF AGREEMENTS, FORM 40.2.15 Executive Employment Agreement 
with Grant of Phantom Stock Options, FORM 770-40.2.15, LEXIS; CALIFORNIA LEGAL FORMS TRANSACTION 
GUIDE, Employment Agreements: Termination of Employment, FORM 187-CL-85.120.11, LEXIS (Matthew 
Bender & Company, Inc.); 28 California Legal Forms--Transaction Guide § 85.551 (2020) Provision for 
Compulsory Arbitration of Matters in Dispute; WARREN'S FORMS OF AGREEMENTS FORM, 40.2.01 AT-
WILL EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.); D. PATRICK O’REILLY & D. 
BRIAN KACEDON, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 327 (8th ed. 2015). 
     125. Clauses, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://adr.org/Clauses (last visited Mar. 5, 2020)(stating that the 
American Arbitration Association example clauses for arbitration use “any” as the determiner to describe 
controversies and claims, but does not mention other available remedies, it only focuses on arbitration. “Any 
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this [employment application; employment ADR program; 
employment contract] shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association 
under its Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures and judgment upon the award rendered by 
the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof”). 
     126. Boeing, NLRB at 7, 16 (discussing that the NLRB instituted an updated test to evaluate work rules 
that encumbered Section 7 rights. The first prong of the test is to determine if a rule when reasonably 
interpreted “would have no tendency to interfere with Section 7 rights and therefore no balancing of rights 
and justifications is warranted.” It remains to be seen if this test will fare better than the previous Lutheran 
Heritage Village-Livonia test. After 15 years of implementation the NLRB had to finally admit it “defied all 
reasonable efforts to make it yield predictable results”). 
     127. See Royal Motor Sales, 2020 NLRB LEXIS 294 (N.L.R.B. May 8, 2020); see also Wendy’s Rest., 
2019 NLRB LEXIS 510 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 11, 2019). 
     128. EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018) (determining that the FAA saving clause did 
not allow for “defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact than an 
agreement to arbitrate is at issue”). 
     129. NFL CBA, supra note 48; NBA CBA, supra note 48; MLS CBA, supra note 48; NHL CBA, supra 
note 48. 
     130. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 262 (2009). 
MCWILLIAMS– ARTICLE  31.2 5/18/2021  10:39 PM 
282 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:2 
collective bargaining can have their section 7 rights prospectively waived by the 
labor organization. The NLRB reiterated this position in D.R. Horton131 by 
stating that the waiver of choice of dispute resolution was legal because it was 
collectively bargained for. Labor unions in their EPIC Systems Corporation 
amicus brief132 expressed that non-represented workers cannot prospectively 
waive their statutory rights to collective adjudication. An individual employee 
cannot waive their rights, but a labor organization can? 133  
Professional sports cover both represented, mostly team, and non-
represented, individual, participants. The rule seemingly provides that 
represented workers get “one bite of the apple” and are bound by the collective 
agreement.134 Conversely, a non-represented worker can make an agreement 
and not be bound because the Board views individual employment contracts as 
contracts of adhesion needing a disclaimer.135 Essentially an arbitration clause 
sans disclaimer is deemed invalid and unenforceable against non-represented 
workers, but the same clause applied to represented workers is valid? That 
doesn’t feel right.136  
Consider the case of DeMeco Ryans,137 an NFL player bound by a collective 
bargaining agreement. Ryans was a player for the Philadelphia Eagles injured 
in a game against the Houston Texans. Ryans maintains that his injury was 
caused by the playing conditions of the field used by the Texans. This injury 
was career ending and Ryans filed a negligence action in the selection of an 
“unreasonably dangerous” artificial turf.138 The case was dismissed in favor of 
arbitration as Ryans was subject to an arbitration clause in the NFL collective 
bargaining agreement.139  
 
     131. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277, 2287 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3, 2012). 
     132. Brief for Ten Int’l Lab. Unions, Nat’l Emp. Law Project, and Nat’l Emp. Law. Ass’n as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (Nos. 16-285, 16-300, and 16-
307), 2017  LEXIS 2893 at 54. 
     133. D.R. Horton, 357 NLRB at 2286 (acknowledging that this question had already been addressed in 
Pyett when that court could see no “distinction between the status of arbitration agreements signed by an 
individual employee and those agreed to by a union representative”). 
     134. Id. (arguing that once an employee has collectively bargained, they have effectively traded their rights, 
like the right to strike, in return for concessions from the employer, and the resulting employment contract 
satisfies the collective action elements of section 7 and like checking a box, the contract terms therefore must 
comply with the NLRA). 
     135. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
Hearing on S. 4213 and S.4214, Subcommittee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9 (1923), the dissent 
in Gilmer quoted Senator Walsh who stated that “It is the same with a good many contracts of employment. 
A man says ‘These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it.’ Well, there is nothing for the man to do except 
to sign it”). 
     136. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 275 (2009) (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight 
System, Inc., 450 U.S. 744 (1981) (the dissent reiterated the concern that collectively bargained terms benefit 
the majority and may not serve the interests of an individual employee, and in that scenario it doesn’t matter 
to that employee how the bargain was struck, the result is the same “take it or leave it”).  
     137. Houston NFL Holding L.P. v. Ryans, 581 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. App. 2019). 
     138. Id. at 904. 
     139. Id. at 911; NFL CBA, supra note 48. 
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Contrast that with Randy Couture,140 an MMA fighter wishing to switch 
promotors. Randy was under contract with Zuffa, known as UFC, that heavily 
favored the UFC with respect to most aspects of the contract.141 Fighter contracts 
hold the championship belt for contracts of adhesion.142 Randy renounced his 
affiliation with UFC and signed a new contract with a rival promotor HDNet 
MMA. UFC filed suit and demanded that Randy’s contract term and the 
subsequent violation of the contract be heard in arbitration. The Texas court 
ruled that indeed the FAA required that the contract be submitted for arbitration 
prior to any judicial action.143  
The interesting part would have been if Randy were an employee and not 
an independent contractor. As such, Randy could have filed an unfair labor 
action with NLRB, and under the Board’s new line of reasoning, could have 
invalidated the arbitration clause for not containing an NLRB disclaimer. Randy 
would then have been able to file a judicial action free of the arbitration clause.  
Let’s not forget DeMeco Ryans. Coverage by a collective bargaining 
agreement would satisfy the NLRB “one bite of the apple” view. The NLRB 
would not review the arbitration clause to deem it invalid because the NLRB 
gives deference to the collective agreement.144 If the UFC and NFL contracts 
both had the same arbitration clause it would be unenforceable for the UFC but 
binding for the NFL? This paradox would change Section 7 of the NLRA to 
protect a worker who “engages in concerted activities, for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, unless already 
represented by a labor organization or collective bargaining agreement.” Of 
course, that is not what it says. In the end the category of worker, represented or 








     140. Zuffa, LLC v. HDNet MMA 2008 LLC, 262 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. App. 2008). 
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BLEACHER REP. (May 14, 2013), https://bleacherrepo rt.com/articles/1516575-the-business-of-fighting-a-
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     142. See Michael Conklin, Two Classifications Enter, One Classification Leaves: Are UFC Fighters 
Employees or Independent Contractors?, 29 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J 227 (2020). 
     143. Zuffa, 262 S.W.3d at 451.  
     144. David Engstrom, Florence St. John and the Unfinished Fight for Fair Employment, STAN. LAW. MAG. 
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/florence-st-john-and-the-unfinished-fight-
for-fair-employment/. A female autoworker named Florence St. John was being paid less than men operating 
the same machinery in the same factory. The pay scales were established through collective bargaining and 
the union refused to address the disparity or support her grievance. She banded together with two dozen other 
women workers and filed a mutual action in federal court which was one of the first gender based “equal pay” 
victories. Id. 
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X. DO CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSES VIOLATE THE NLRA? 
 
Another creative route to invalidation involves discovery and settlement 
confidentiality language in arbitration clauses. In Pfizer,145 an NLRB 
administrative law judge devoted over 140 pages to express their disdain with 
EPIC Systems Corporation and to create a new basis for rejection of mandatory 
arbitration. The arbitration clause contained language of individualized 
arbitration, plus an agreement to keep discovery information and the settlement 
confidential. The confidentiality clause excluded information specifically 
spelled out in Section 7 of the NLRA, like wages, hours, employment 
conditions, etc.146 The Judge concluded that an employee cannot prospectively 
grant confidentiality and that confidentiality of settlements violates Section 7 of 
the NLRA. A Section 7 violation is immediately a Section 8 “unfair workplace” 
violation and void with respect to the NLRA.  
The Judge ruled that workers have a statutory right to provide and “know 
of” settlements between similarly situated employees and the employer.147 
Yikes. The Judge believes that individual settlements are terms and conditions 
of employment, and as such the “activity” of sharing the information is covered 
substantively under Section 7. Even the Department of Labor general counsel 
advised148 the judge that “Confidentiality provisions that confine themselves to 
information concerning matters disclosed in the arbitration hearing and relating 
to the arbitration do not significantly implicate Section 7 rights, and therefore, 
in conformity with Epic, such agreements should be enforced as written.”149  
The Judge exercised powers that the Judge believed were conveyed to the 
NLRB in section 10(a) of the NLRA.150 Section 10(a) provides that the Board is 
empowered to prevent unfair labor practices and that power shall not be affected 
by any other means of adjustment or prevention established by law.151 The 
interpretation is that the FAA cannot interfere with the Boards power to declare 
labor practices unfair.152 That is correct, but the Board cannot declare anything 
it dislikes as an unfair labor practice. Time will tell if this avenue of arbitration 
invalidation gains traction.153 
From a professional sports law perspective, this is a crucial development. 
Many of the disputes that arise between employers and players involve sensitive 
 
     145. Pfizer, Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 199 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 21, 2019). 
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     153. Cal. Commerce Club, Inc. & William J. Sauk., 2020 NLRB LEXIS 320 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 19, 2020) 
(determining that a confidentiality requirement in an arbitration clause was not invalid due to Section 7 of the 
NLRA).  
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details that the parties wish to keep secret. Owners and players are managing 
more than workplace behavior, they are managing the marketing and brand 
images of the league, team, and individual athletic personas. Publication of the 
gory details of the issues and the ultimate settlement could cost either side 
millions of dollars in future earnings from tickets, sponsors and endorsements. 
Athletes like Tiger Woods, Lance Armstrong, Maria Sharapova, Michael Vick, 
and Jason Giambi have lost large amounts revenue from personal endorsement 
deals due to personal tribulations made public. We can bet they would have 
preferred that those incidents were kept private.   
Another example involves the collusion grievance and settlement between 
the NFL, Colin Kaepernick, and Eric Reid. The details of this settlement were 
not publicly disclosed as per a confidentiality agreement between the parties. 
Fellow union members do not know the details of the settlement, but as 
mentioned earlier, the NLRB will not view that as a Section 7 violation. They 
will view a prospective agreement to confidentiality of discovery and settlement 




After ninety-five years of FAA protection, arbitration is not well received 
by the judiciary or the NLRB. The Court has, like the Amphilogiai of ancient 
Greece, engaged in endless debate regarding the merits and legality of 
arbitration. The antagonists of this Vince McMahon154 performance script 
repetitively denigrate the arbitration process and arbitrators. Their preference 
would be for all employment contracts to be open for judicial interpretation and 
revocation, except for collectively bargained agreements. Apparently, those 
employees are stuck with whatever dispute resolution process the agreement 
calls for. 
The protagonists are not wholly sold on arbitration either. They 
begrudgingly accept bi-lateral arbitration as enforceable, but balk at cost 
effective multi-party arbitration. In Lamps Plus, Inc.155 the Court described class 
arbitrations as so far removed from the ordinary understanding of bilateral 
arbitration that parties must expressly authorize their use. The Court further 
suggested that “[c]ourts may not infer from ambiguous agreement that parties 
 
     154. See Richard Hoy-Browne, Historic Moments in Wrestling Part 6: Vince McMahon Admits Wrestling 
is Predetermined, INDEP. (May 30, 2014), https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/general/wwe-mma-
wrestling/historic-moments-wrestling-part-6-vince-mcmahon-admits-wrestling-predetermined-
9461429.html. Vince McMahon is the Chief Executive Officer of World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE). 
McMahon was one of the first to admit that the matches were predetermined according to performance scripts 
for each wrestler. These scripts would involve performers winning, losing, making and breaking alliances. 
Performers would routinely move between heroic and villainous personifications of their characters. 
McMahon also started the XFL. Id. 
     155. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). 
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have consented to arbitrate on a classwide basis.”156 Ironically, arbitration of 
multi-party claims157 is at the heart of the collectively bargained dispute 
resolution process. It is not some novel, untested form of adjudication. 
The reluctance of the courts and NLRB to accept employment arbitration 
falls on five issues. The first is that the FAA requires the court to give deference 
to the arbiter’s findings and the arbitration outcome. The second is that 
arbitration is limited in scope by contract and is not amenable to novel legal 
theories. The third is that attorneys are not going to get rich pursuing individual 
arbitration claims. The negotiating position of individual claimants in 
settlements is weak when compared to class groups resulting in lower 
settlements and contingency fees. The fourth is that there is a divergence in the 
characterization of, and rights associated with collectively bargained versus 
individual employment contracts. And fifth, that an arbitration award forecloses 
subsequent action.  
For the sports world, employment contracts either collectively or 
individually bargained, contain arbitration as the principle means of dispute 
resolution. This has opened avenues of contract interpretation, like salary and 
discipline, that would be woefully underserved in a judicial setting. Specifically, 
salary and discipline are time sensitive to the athlete due to the limited window 
for performance. The confidentiality of arbitration benefits athletes and owners 
alike as public opinion directly impacts endorsements and ticket sales. Sensitive 
issues like substance abuse, settlements, and injuries are best left to the 
management of the parties and not outside interests, like the media. Even with 
these benefits, the animus towards arbitration continues and sadly EPIC Systems 
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v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2838) (describing the ability of arbitration 
to handle class or collective arbitrations dealing with substantive law and contractual issues). 
